Llicenciatura en Economia (3322)
Llicenciatura en Administraciķ i Direcciķ d'Empreses (3323)
Economia Experimental (11867)
Pre-requisits
En el curs s’admetrā un nombre māxim de 28 estudiants que formaran set equips de laboratori. Si el nombre de solˇlicituds excedís el de places, la selecciķ dels estudiants es faria per mčrits acadčmics. Haver cursat i aprovat cursos de decisiķ i de jocs constitueix un mčrit.
Mecānica del curs
Students in the Experimental Economics course will be instructed on
the experimental method and its applications, and will have to
design, perform and analyze two experiments, one of them original.
The course will be divided in two parts. During the first
part we will show you how economists use the laboratory tools. For
that purpose we will focus on some particular series of experiments
in markets and industrial organization, bargaining, public goods,
coordination and individual decision-making. Students will be
grouped in teams and every team will have to
replicate and
analyze in class one classical experiment. The presentation
of the experiment in class should include a motivation, a complete
description of the related literature and a careful comparative
analysis of the results obtained in class.
During the second part of the course, every team will chose,
in coordination with the course instructor, a topic to be
experimentally explored. The experiment, this time an
original one, will again be run and discussed in class. A
complete paper on the experiment, with a motivated introduction, a
description of the literature, results and conclusions including an
indication of further research, plus an appendix with instructions,
will have to be handed in no later than June 22nd.
We expect that this course will help you think about
economics as an experimental science and to provide you with a
working knowledge of techniques for conducting laboratory
experiments in economics. Your grade will be based on your
performance as an experimentalist, which means on your class
participation, on how you run your experiments, on your class
presentations, and on the term paper. Notice that there will be no
exam in this course. This also means that there will be no exam in
September. If you fail to work during the course, your course grade
will be: fail, June and September.
You should be aware that I assume that you are familiar with
the contents of
Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists, by Friedman
and Sunder (1994). This is a short and basic book, very informative
and easy to read. Some copies of the book are available in the UPF
library.
The following is a more detailed Program of the course
lectures. The rest of the scheduled time is devoted to your
experiments and your analysis of your experiments as is described
in the accompanying timetable.
Lectures
Les regles del joc
ROTH, A. E. "Introduction to Experimental Economics". A:
KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E.
The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Nova York: Princeton
University Press, 1995. Pāg. 1-98.
SMITH, V. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental
Science".
American Economic Review. Desembre de 1982. Pāg. 923-955.
SMITH, V. "Experimental Methods in Economics". A: EATWELL,
J. i d’altres (eds).
The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. Nova York:
Stockton Press, 1988.
SMITH, V. "Experimental Methods in Economics".
UPF Working Paper. Juny de 1992.
Decisiķ individual i en grup
BLINDER, A. S.; MORGAN, J. "Are Two Heads Better than One?
An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decision Making".
NBER WP, 7909. Setembre del 2000.
HUNG, A. A.; PLOTT, C. R. "Information Cascades: Replication
and an Extension to Majority Rule and conformity Rewarding
Institutions".
AER. (En premsa).
THALER, R. H.
The Winners Curse. The Free Press, 1992. Cap. 6 i 7.
Conflicte i cooperaciķ; coordinaciķ
ANDREONI, J.; MILLER, J. H. "Rational Cooperation in the
Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence".
Economic Journal, 103. 1993. Pāg. 570-585.
AXELROD, R.
The Evolution of Cooperation. Nova York: Basic Books, 1984.
SELTEN, R.; STOECKER, R. "End Behavior in Sequences of
Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames".
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7. 1986. Pāg.
47-70.
VAN HUYCK, J. B.; BATTALIO, R. C.; BEIL, R. O. "Tacit
Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination
Failure".
AER, 80. 1990. Pāg. 234-248.
Béns públics
ISAAC, R. M.; McCUE, K.; PLOTT, C. "Public Goods Provision
in an Experimental Environment".
Journal of Public Economics, 26. 1985. Pāg. 51-74.
LEDYARD, John O. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental
Research". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E.
The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.):
Princeton, 1995. Pāg. 111-181.
Dictadors, ultimātums, altruisme i reciprocitat
CAMERER, C.; THALER, R. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators,
and Manners".
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (2). 1995. Pāg. 209-219.
FEHR, E.; GACHTER, S. "Fairness and Retaliation: The
Economics of Reciprocity".
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (3). 2000. Pāg.
159-181.
GUETH, W.; SCHMITTBERGER, R.; SCHWARZ, B. "An experimental
Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining".
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3. 1982. Pāg.
367-388.
PRASNIKAR, V.; ROTH, A. "Considerations of Fairness and
Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games".
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992. Pāg. 865-888.
ROTH, Alvin i d’altres. "Bargaining and Market
Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: Some
experimental Evidence".
AER, 81. 1991. Pāg. 1.068-1.095.
ROTH, A. E.; MURNIGHAN, J. K.; SCHOUMAKER, F. "The Deadline
Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence".
AER, 78. 1988. Pāg. 806-823.
Organitzaciķ de mercats
GODE, D.; SUNDER, S. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with
ZI Traders".
Journal of Political Economy, 1993. Pāg. 119-137.
HOLT, Charles A.; LANGAN, L.; VILLAMIL, Anne P. "Market
Power in Oral Double Auctions".
Economic Enquiry, gener de 1986. Pāg. 107-123.
HOLT, Charles A. "Industrial Organization: A Survey of
Laboratory Research". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E.
The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.):
Princeton, 1995. Pāg. 349-435.
SMITH, V. "Markets as Economizers of Information:
Experimental Examination of the Hayek Hypothesis".
Economic Inquiry, abril de 1982. Pāg. 165-179.
Mercats de valors
LEI, Vivian; NOUSSAIR, Charles N.; PLOTT, Charles R.
"Non-speculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of
Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality".
Econometrica. (En premsa).
PLOTT, Charles R. "Markets as Information Gathering Tools".
Southern Economic Journal, 67 (1). 2000. Pāg. 1-15.
SMITH, Vernon L.; SUCHANEK, Gerry L.; WILLIAMS, Arlington W.
"Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogeneous expectations in Experimental
Spot Asset Markets".
Econometrica, 56 (6). 1988. Pāg. 1.119-1.152.
SUNDER, Shyam. "Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey". A:
KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E.
The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.):
Princeton, 1995. Pāg. 445-495.
Subhastes
COX, J.; SMITH, V.; WALKER, J. "Theory and Individual
Behavior of First Price Auctions".
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, marį de 1988. Pāg. 61-99.
HARRISON, G. "Theory and Misbehavior in First Price
Auctions".
AER, setembre de 1989. Pāg. 749-762.
KAGEL, John H.; LEVIN, Dan. "The Winner’s Curse and
Public Information in Common Value Auctions".
AER, desembre de 1986. Pāg. 894-920.
KAGEL, J. H. "Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research".
A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E.
The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.):
Princeton, 1995. Pāg. 501-557.
Mercat de treball, incentius, salaris, contractes
FEHR, Ernst; GACHTER, Simon; KIRCHSTEIGER, Georg.
"Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device".
Econometrica, 65 (4). 1997. Pāg. 833-860.
FEHR, Ernst; FALK, Armin. "Wage Rigidity in a Competitive
Incomplete Contract Market".
Journal of Political Economy, 107. 1999. Pāg. 106-134.
FEHR, Ernst; GACHTER, Simon. "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd
out Voluntary Cooperation?".
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics WP, 34.
2000.
Disseny d'institucions i mercats com a instruments de predicciķ
CASON, Timothy N.; PLOTT, Charles. "EPA New Emissions
Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation".
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30. 1996.
Pāg. 133-160.
FORSYTHE, Robert i d'altres. "Anatomy of an Experimental
Political Stock Market".
American Economic Review, 82 (5). 1992. Pāg.
1.142-1.161.