Llicenciatura en Economia (3322)
Llicenciatura en Administració i Direcció d'Empreses (3323)

Economia Experimental (11867) 

Pre-requisits

"Taking a course in experimental economics is a little like going to dinner at a cannibal's house. Sometimes you will be the diner, sometimes you will be part of the dinner, sometimes both." Ted Bergstrom and John Miller.
Efectivament, prendre un curs d'economia experimental és una mica com ser convidat a dinar a casa d'un caníbal. A vegades ets el comensal, a vegades formes part de les viandes, i sovint acaben passant les dues coses a la vegada.
Si preneu un curs de laboratori en les ciències de la natura, feu rodar boles, o disseccioneu la proverbial granota, o us empastifeu amb productes químics. En tots els casos sou sempre l'experimentador, mai el subjecte experimental. És difícil imaginar-se a un químic posant-se en el lloc d'una molècula de nitrogen, o a un biòleg que estudia els reflexes de la granota, ocupant el seu lloc per una estona. En canvi, l'estudiant que prengui aquest curs serà més afortunat. En els experiments que es facin a classe, serà a la vegada un participant i un observador.
En els experiments d'aquest curs estudiarem els comportaments i les interaccions de la gent en situacions interessants des del punt de vista econòmic. I, al ser tu mateix un d'aquests agents econòmics que pren decisions, viuràs de primera mà els problemes que confronta un agent econòmic. El nostre càlcul és que tant aprendràs sobre els principis de l'economia -i sobre com fer experiments- per haver participat en els experiments com per l'anàlisi dels experiments que hauràs de fer en tant que observador científic.
En el curs s’admetrà un nombre màxim de 28 estudiants que formaran set equips de laboratori. Si el nombre de sol·licituds excedís el de places, la selecció dels estudiants es faria per mèrits acadèmics.

Mecànica del curs

(Ho tinc en anglès perquè ho vaig escriure per un curs que vaig donar en aquesta llengua. Confio que ho entengueu. Si no, malament, perquè l'anglès per un economista és una eina fonamental).
Students in the Experimental Economics course will be instructed on the experimental method and its applications, and will have to design, perform and analyze two experiments, one of them original.
The course will be divided in two parts. During the first part we will show you how economists use the laboratory tools. For that purpose we will focus on some particular series of experiments in markets and industrial organization, bargaining, public goods, coordination and individual decision-making. Students will be grouped in teams and every team will have to replicate and analyze in class one classical experiment. The presentation of the experiment in class should include a motivation, a complete description of the related literature and a careful comparative analysis of the results obtained in class.
During the second part of the course, every team will chose, in coordination with the course instructor, a topic to be experimentally explored. The experiment, this time an original one, will again be run and discussed in class. A complete paper on the experiment, with a motivated introduction, a description of the literature, results and conclusions including an indication of further research, plus an appendix with instructions, will have to be handed in no later than June 22nd.
We expect that this course will help you think about economics as an experimental science and to provide you with a working knowledge of techniques for conducting laboratory experiments in economics. Your grade will be based on your performance as an experimentalist, which means on your class participation, on how you run your experiments, on your class presentations, and on the term paper. Notice that there will be no exam in this course. This also means that there will be no exam in September. If you fail to work during the course, your course grade will be: fail, June and September.
You should be aware that I assume that you are familiar with the contents of Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists, by Friedman and Sunder (1994). This is a short and basic book, very informative and easy to read. Some copies of the book are available in the UPF library.
The following is a more detailed Program of the course lectures. The rest of the scheduled time is devoted to your experiments and your analysis of your experiments as is described in the accompanying timetable.

Lectures

Les regles del joc
ROTH, A. E. "Introduction to Experimental Economics". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Nova York: Princeton University Press, 1995. Pàg. 1-98.
SMITH, V. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science". American Economic Review. Desembre de 1982. Pàg. 923-955.
SMITH, V. "Experimental Methods in Economics". A: EATWELL, J. i d’altres (eds). The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. Nova York: Stockton Press, 1988.
SMITH, V. "Experimental Methods in Economics". UPF Working Paper. Juny de 1992.

Decisió individual i en grup
BLINDER, A. S.; MORGAN, J. "Are Two Heads Better than One? An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decision Making". NBER WP, 7909. Setembre del 2000.
HUNG, A. A.; PLOTT, C. R. "Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and conformity Rewarding Institutions". AER. (En premsa).
THALER, R. H. The Winners Curse. The Free Press, 1992. Cap. 6 i 7.

Conflicte i cooperació; coordinació
ANDREONI, J.; MILLER, J. H. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence". Economic Journal, 103. 1993. Pàg. 570-585.
AXELROD, R. The Evolution of Cooperation. Nova York: Basic Books, 1984.
SELTEN, R.; STOECKER, R. "End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7. 1986. Pàg. 47-70.
VAN HUYCK, J. B.; BATTALIO, R. C.; BEIL, R. O. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Failure". AER, 80. 1990. Pàg. 234-248.

Béns públics
ISAAC, R. M.; McCUE, K.; PLOTT, C. "Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment". Journal of Public Economics, 26. 1985. Pàg. 51-74.
LEDYARD, John O. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.): Princeton, 1995. Pàg. 111-181.

Dictadors, ultimàtums, altruisme i reciprocitat
CAMERER, C.; THALER, R. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators, and Manners". Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (2). 1995. Pàg. 209-219.
FEHR, E.; GACHTER, S. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity". Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (3). 2000. Pàg. 159-181.
GUETH, W.; SCHMITTBERGER, R.; SCHWARZ, B. "An experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3. 1982. Pàg. 367-388.
PRASNIKAR, V.; ROTH, A. "Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games". Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992. Pàg. 865-888.
ROTH, Alvin i d’altres. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: Some experimental Evidence". AER, 81. 1991. Pàg. 1.068-1.095.
ROTH, A. E.; MURNIGHAN, J. K.; SCHOUMAKER, F. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence". AER, 78. 1988. Pàg. 806-823.

Organització de mercats
GODE, D.; SUNDER, S. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with ZI Traders". Journal of Political Economy, 1993. Pàg. 119-137.
HOLT, Charles A.; LANGAN, L.; VILLAMIL, Anne P. "Market Power in Oral Double Auctions". Economic Enquiry, gener de 1986. Pàg. 107-123.
HOLT, Charles A. "Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.): Princeton, 1995. Pàg. 349-435.
SMITH, V. "Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental Examination of the Hayek Hypothesis". Economic Inquiry, abril de 1982. Pàg. 165-179.

Mercats de valors
LEI, Vivian; NOUSSAIR, Charles N.; PLOTT, Charles R. "Non-speculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality". Econometrica. (En premsa).
PLOTT, Charles R. "Markets as Information Gathering Tools". Southern Economic Journal, 67 (1). 2000. Pàg. 1-15.
SMITH, Vernon L.; SUCHANEK, Gerry L.; WILLIAMS, Arlington W. "Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogeneous expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets". Econometrica, 56 (6). 1988. Pàg. 1.119-1.152.
SUNDER, Shyam. "Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.): Princeton, 1995. Pàg. 445-495.

Subhastes
COX, J.; SMITH, V.; WALKER, J. "Theory and Individual Behavior of First Price Auctions". Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, març de 1988. Pàg. 61-99.
HARRISON, G. "Theory and Misbehavior in First Price Auctions". AER, setembre de 1989. Pàg. 749-762.
KAGEL, John H.; LEVIN, Dan. "The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions". AER, desembre de 1986. Pàg. 894-920.
KAGEL, J. H. "Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.): Princeton, 1995. Pàg. 501-557.

Mercat de treball, incentius, salaris, contractes
FEHR, Ernst; GACHTER, Simon; KIRCHSTEIGER, Georg. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device". Econometrica, 65 (4). 1997. Pàg. 833-860.
FEHR, Ernst; FALK, Armin. "Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market". Journal of Political Economy, 107. 1999. Pàg. 106-134.
FEHR, Ernst; GACHTER, Simon. "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?". Institute for Empirical Research in Economics WP, 34. 2000.

Disseny d'institucions i mercats com a instruments de predicció
CASON, Timothy N.; PLOTT, Charles. "EPA New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation". Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30. 1996. Pàg. 133-160.
FORSYTHE, Robert i d'altres. "Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market". American Economic Review, 82 (5). 1992. Pàg. 1.142-1.161.