Llicenciatura en Administració i Direcció d'Empreses (3323)
Llicenciatura en Economia (3322)
Microeconomia Aplicada(11840)
I. COMPATIBILITAT TECNOLŅGICA
Tema 1. Introducció
Panorąmica.
Tema 2. Equilibri amb economies de xarxa
Elecció tecnolņgica, compatibilitat i entrada. Costos de substitució.
Tema 3. Economies de xarxa i contractes
Tema 4. Un cas prąctic
El judici a Microsoft.
II. INTERACCIÓ EN MERCATS DE POCS AGENTS
Tema 5. Negociació
Enfocament axiomątic i estratčgic.
Tema 6. Subhastes
Comportament i disseny.
Tema 7. Contractes de proveļment, pśblics i privats
Tema 8. Recerca i negociació amb partners
Bibliografia
ANTON, J.; YAO, D. "Second sourcing and the
experience curve: price competition in defense procurement".
Rand Journal of Economics, 18(1). 1987. Pąg. 57-76.
BURGUET, R. "Auction Theory; a guided tour". Investigaciones Económicas. 1999. [ En premsa] .
BURGUET, R. "Optimal repeated purchases when
buyers are learning about costs".
Journal of Economic Theory, 68(2). 1996. Pąg. 440-455.
CHOI, J. P. "Irreversible choice of uncertain technologies with network externalities". Rand Journal of Economics, 25(3). 1994. Pąg. 382-401.
CHOU, C.; SHY, O. "Network effects without
network externalities".
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 8. 1990.
Pąg. 259-270.
CHURCH, J.; GANDAL, N. "Network effects, software provision, and standardization". Journal of Industrial Economics, 40. 1992. Pąg. 85-104.
ECONOMIDES, N. "Desirability of compatibility in
the absence of network externalities".
American Economic Review, 79. 1989. Pąg. 1165-1181.
EINHORN, M. A. "Mix and match compatibility with verttical product dimensions". Rand Journal of Economics, 23. 1992. Pąg. 535-546.
FARRELL, J.; SALONER, G. "Standardization,
compatibility and innovation".
Rand Journal of Economics, 16. 1985. Pąg. 70-83.
FARRELL, J.; SALONER, G. "Installed base and compatibility: Innovation product preannouncements and predation". American Economic Review, 76. 1986. Pąg. 940-955.
FARRELL, J.; MONROE, H.; SALONER, G. "The
vertical organization of industry: Systems competition versus
component competition".
Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 7, 2. 1998. Pąg. 143-182.
GARCĶA-MARIŃOSO, B. Technological compatibility, endogenous switching costs and lock-in opportunities. University of East Anglia: The Economics Research Center DP#9811, 1998.
KATZ, M. L.; SHAPIRO, C. "Network externalities,
competition and compatibility".
American Economic Review, 75. 1985. Pąg. 424-440.
KATZ, M. L.; SHAPIRO, C. "Technology adoption in the presence of network externalities". Journal of Political Economy, 94. 1986. Pąg. 822-841.
KATZ, M. L.; SHAPIRO, C. "Product introduction
with network externalities".
Journal of Industrial Economics, 40. 1992. Pąg. 55-83.
KRISTIANSEN, E. "R&D in markets with networks externalities". International Journal of Industrial Organization,14. 1990. Pąg. 769-784.
MATUTES, C.; PADILLA, J. "Shared ATM networks
and banking competition".
European Economic Review, 38. 1994. Pąg. 1113-1138.
MATUTES, C.; REGIBEAU, P. "Mix and match: Product compatibility without network externalities". Rand Journal of Economics, 19. 1988. Pąg. 221-243.
MATUTES, C.; REGIBEAU, P. "Compatibility and
bundling of complementarity goods in a duopoly".
Journal of Industrial Economics, 40. 1992. Pąg. 37-54.
McMILLAN, J.; ROTHSCHILD, M. "Search". A: AUMANN, R. J.; HART, S. (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1994.
MILGROM, P. "Auctions and bidding; A primer".
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3. 1989. Pąg. 3-22.
OSBORNE, M.; RUBINSTEIN, A. Bargaining and Markets. San Diego (Calif.): Academic Press, 1990.
REGIBEAU, P.; ROCKETT, K. "The Timing of product introduction and the credibility of compatibility decisions". International Journal of industrial Organization, 14(6). 1996. Pąg. 801-823.
ROB, F. "The design of procurement contracts". American Economic Review, 76(3). 1986. Pąg. 378-389.
THUM, M. "Network externalities, technological progress, and the competition of market contracts". International Journal of Industrial Organization, 12. 1994. Pąg. 269-289.
WHINSTON, M. D. "Tying, foreclosure, and exclusion". American Economic Review, 80. 1990. Pąg. 837-859.
WOLFSTETTER, E. "Auctions: An introduction". Journal of Economic Surveys, 10(4). 1996. Pąg. 367-418.
Tema 2
Fusions horitzontals.
Tema 3
Col·lusió tącita.
Bibliografia
KWOKA, J. E.; WHITE, L. J.
The Antitrust Revolution. Nova York: Harper Collins
College, 1994.
LAFFONT, J.; MARTIMORT, D.
The Theory of Incentives I: The Principal-Agent Model.
2001. (En premsa).
LAFFONT, J.; TIROLE, J.
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation.
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1993.
SCHMALENSEE, R.; WILLING, R.
Handbook of Industrial Organization. Elsevier Science,
1989. Vol. I i II. Cap. 23-24.
TIROLE, J.
The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge (Mass.):
MIT, 1988.
VISCUSI, W.; VERNON, J.; HARRINGTON, J.
Economics of Regulation and Antitrust. Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1995.