Llicenciatura en Economia (3322)
Llicenciatura en Administració i Direcció d'Empreses (3323)

Economia Experimental (11867) 

Permeteu-me que escrigui el programa del curs Economia Experimental en anglès. Servirà perquè aquells que no entenguin el que posa en les pàgines següents desisteixin de fer el curs. I faran bé, perquè les lectures són totes en anglès (inevitable en economia avançada) i perquè ocasionalment podríem convidar algun professor que parlés només en anglès. Jo faré les meves classes en català, de manera que no recomano que faci el curs ningú que no l'entengui, i la Rosemarie Nagel pot ser que faci alguna classe, que impartirà en castellà, de manera que ídem. En definitiva, si no enteneu català, castellà i anglès, les tres llengües, és millor que passeu de llarg.

Students in the Experimental Economics course will be instructed on the experimental method and its applications, and will have to design, perform and analyze two experiments, one of them original.

The course will be divided in two parts. During the first part we will show you how economists use the laboratory tools. For that purpose we will focus on some particular series of experiments in markets and industrial organization, bargaining, public goods, coordination and individual decision making. Students will be grouped in teams and every team will have to replicate and analyze in class one classical experiment. The presentation of the experiment should include a motivation, a complete description of the related literature and a careful comparative analysis of the results obtained in class. An exam may be prepared to test the students' knowledge of the experimental literature.

During the second part of the course, every team will chose, in coordination with the course instructor, a topic to be experimentally explored. The experiment, this time an original one, will again be run and discussed in class. A complete paper on the experiment, with a motivated introduction, a description of the literature, results and conclusions including an indication of further research, plus an appendix with instructions will have to be handed in no later than June 20th.

We expect that this course will help you think about economics as an experimental science and to provide you with a working knowledge of techniques for conducting laboratory experiments in economics. Your grade will be based on your performance as an experimentalist, which means on the mid-term exam, on your class presentations and on the term paper.

You should be aware that I will assume that you are familiar with the contents of Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists, by Friedman and Sunder (1994). This is a short and basic book, very informative and easy to read. Some copies of the book are available in the UPF library.

The following is a more detailed program of the course lectures. The rest of the scheduled time is devoted to your experiments and your analysis of your experiments as is described in the accompanying timetable.

The Rules of the Game

ROTH, A. E. "Introduction to Experimental Economics". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Nova York: Princeton University Press, 1995. Pàg. 1-98.

SMITH, V. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science". American Economic Review. Desembre de 1982. Pàg. 923-955.

SMITH, V. "Experimental Methods in Economics". A: EATWELL, J. i d'altres (eds). The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. Londres: Macmillan, 1988.

SMITH, V. "Experimental Methods in Economics". UPF Working Paper. Juny de 1992.

Individual Decision Making

GRETHER, D.; PLOTT, C. "Economic Theory of choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon". AER, 69. 1979. Pàg. 623-638.

HEY, John. Experiments in economics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. Capítols 4, 5 i 6.

LOOMES, G. "Evidence of a New Violation of the Independence Axiom". Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4. 1991. Pàg. 91-108.

Conflict and Cooperation; Coordination

ANDREONI, J.; MILLER, J. H. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence". EJ, 103. 1993. Pàg. 570-585.

AXELROD, R. The Evolution of Cooperation. Nova York: Basic Books, 1984.

SELTEN, R.; STOECKER, R. "End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner's Dilemma Supergames". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7. 1986. Pàg. 47-70.

VAN HUYCK, J. B.; BATTALIO, R. C.; BEIL, R. O. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Failure". AER, 80. 1990. Pàg. 234-248.

Market Organization

GODE, D.; SUNDER, S. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with ZI Traders". Journal of Political Economy, 1993. Pàg. 119-137.

HOLT, Charles A.; LANGAN, L.; VILLAMIL, Anne P. "Market Power in Oral Double Auctions". Economic Enquiry, gener de 1986. Pàg. 107-123.

HOLT, Charles A. "Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.): Princeton, 1995. Pàg. 349-435.

SMITH, V. "Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental Examination of the Hayek Hypothesis". Economic Inquiry, abril de 1982. Pàg. 165-179.

Public Goods

CROSON, R. T. A. Expectations in Voluntary Contributions Mechanisms. Mimeo, 1995.

ISAAC, R. M.; McCUE, K.; PLOTT, C. "Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment". Journal of Public Economics, 26. 1985. Pàg. 51-74.

LEDYARD, John O. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research". A: DAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.): Princeton, 1995. Pàg. 111-181.

PALFREY, T. R.; PRISBREY, J. E. Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Environments: How Much and Why? Mimeo, 1992.

Games with Iterated Dominant Strategies

HO, T. H.; WEIGELT, K.; CAMERER, C. "Iterated Dominance and Learning in Experimental "Beauty Contest" Games". Discussion paper, 1995.

McKELVEY, R.; PALFREY, T. P. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game". Econometrica, 60. 1992. Pàg. 803-836.

NAGEL, R. "Unravelling in Guessing Games: An experimental Study". AER, 85 (5). 1995. Pàg. 1.313-1.326.

Bargaining

GUETH, W.; SCHMITTBERGER, R.; SCHWARZ, B. "An experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3. 1982. Pàg. 367-388.

PRASNIKAR, V.; ROTH, A. "Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games". Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992. Pàg. 865-888.

SMITH, Vernon L.; SUCHANEK, Gerry L.; WILLIAMS, Arlington W. "Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogeneous expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets". Econometrica, 56 (6). 1988. Pàg. 1.119-1.152.

SUNDER, Shyam. "Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.): Princeton, 1995. Pàg. 445-495.

 

ROTH, Alvin i d'altres. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: Some experimental Evidence". AER, 81. 1991. Pàg. 1.068-1.095.

ROTH, A. E.; MURNIGHAN, J. K.; SCHOUMAKER, F. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence". AER, 78. 1988. Pàg. 806-823.

ROTH. Chapter on Bargaining in the Handbook.

Asset Markets

SMITH, Vernon L.; SUCHANEK, Gerry L.; WILLIAMS, Arlington W. "Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogeneous expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets". Econometrica, 56 (6). 1988. Pàg. 1.119-1.152.

SUNDER, Shyam. "Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.): Princeton, 1995. Pàg. 445-495.

Auctions

COX, J.; SMITH, V.; WALKER, J. "Theory and Individual Behavior of First Price Auctions". Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, març de 1988. Pàg. 61-99.

HARRISON, G. "Theory and Misbehavior in First Price Auctions". AER, setembre de 1989. Pàg. 749-762.

KAGEL, John H.; LEVIN, Dan. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions". AER, desembre de 1986. Pàg. 894-920.

KAGEL, J. H. "Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research". A: KAGEL, J.; ROTH, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton (N. J.): Princeton, 1995. Pàg. 501-557.

RUST, J.; MILLER, J. H.; PALMER, R. "Behavior of Trading Automata in a Computerized Double Auction Market". A: FRIEDMAN, D.; RUST, J. (eds). The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence. Reading (Mass.): Addison-Wesley, 1992.